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One of the oldest substantive due process rights derived from the 
Fourteenth Amendment and recognized by the Supreme Court is the 
right of individuals to be free from government intrusion into the 
control and management of their families.1 Despite its rhetoric that 
familial rights are a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court’s recognition of this right 
has been far from clear. Until recently,2 the articulation of this right 
has been enmeshed in the analysis of other constitutional rights, and 
even the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence is ambivalent towards 
this liberty interest, making it difficult to decipher the scope of this 
right and the appropriate standard to determine when it should be 
protected.  
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; A.M., 2001, University of Chicago; B.A., 1999, Hamilton College. I 
would like to acknowledge Nikolai G. Guerra and Nicole L. Little for their careful 
edits of this Note. 
1 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
2 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
1
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The Seventh Circuit’s most recent case involving a claim of 
familial rights, United States v. Hollingsworth, is instructive because 
the court applied a balancing test developed by its previous decisions3 
to determine when this substantive due process right should be 
protected.4 This decision serves as a predictive case study that 
illustrates how the Seventh Circuit will analyze familial rights claims 
in the future. 
In this Note, I will argue that from its initial recognition of 
familial rights, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this liberty 
interest has been riddled with ambivalence. While the Court has 
rhetorically endorsed this right, its application in its decisions 
demonstrates that the Court has been and continues to be reluctant to 
fully embrace and define this liberty interest. Following the Supreme 
Court’s lead, the Seventh Circuit’s balancing test provides courts with 
the flexibility to both acknowledge this due process right but also 
allow the state to intervene when the safety and well-being of children 
is threatened. 
Section I of this Note will analyze the evolution of the substantive 
due process right of familial relations. Subsection A of this first section 
will explore the Supreme Court’s early decisions that recognized 
familial rights and the Court’s inability to isolate and explicate this 
liberty interest in its holdings. Subsection B will analyze Troxel v. 
Granville,5 the Court’s most recent and fractured treatment of familial 
rights. This subsection will underscore the Court’s continued 
ambivalence and lack of clarity towards this liberty interest. 
Subsection C will introduce the Seventh Circuit’s adoption of a 
balancing test in the wake of Troxel. Section II will present the 
procedural and factual background of Hollingsworth. This section will 
also analyze the court’s application of its balancing test to the facts of 
the case. Section III will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s application of 
the balancing test corresponds with the Supreme Court’s ambivalent 
                                                 
3 Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018–19 (7th Cir. 2000); Doe v. 
Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 518–19 (7th Cir. 2003). 
4 United States v. Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2007). 
5 530 U.S. 57. 
2
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position on familial rights, and provides a predictive measure of how 
future courts will recognize and protect familial rights. 
 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FAMILIAL RIGHTS 
 
A. The Substantive Due Process Right to Familial Relations 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of United States Constitution states 
that “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”6 While this clause clearly provides a 
guarantee of fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property by a state, the Supreme Court has also recognized 
that this clause, as well as its Fifth Amendment counterpart, guarantees 
more than just fair process:7 it protects “individual liberty against 
‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of procedures 
used to implement them.’”8 Generally, the Court grants broad 
deference to the legislature and requires that laws merely be rational in 
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.9 But when a law 
infringes on a substantive aspect of liberty or fundamental rights, the 
Court demands that the state narrowly tailor that law “to serve a 
compelling state interest.”10 In order to be protected by this heightened 
scrutiny standard, a right must be fundamental, which means that it is 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that “neither liberty 
                                                 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
7 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997) (holding that the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a substantive component 
that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests”). 
8 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels 
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). 
9 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (stating 
that due process provides broad deference to government in choosing the ways and 
means by which it carries out its policies). 
10 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993). 
3
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nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”11 The Supreme Court 
has held that the liberty protected by the due process clause includes 
the rights to marry;12 to have children;13 to marital privacy;14 to the use 
of contraception;15 to bodily integrity;16 and to have an abortion.17  
One of the oldest liberty interests recognized by the Supreme 
Court under the theory of substantive due process is the interest that 
parents have in the care, custody, control, and management of their 
children.18 In the first half of the twentieth century, the Court decided 
three cases that held that the fundamental liberty protections of the due 
process clause include the right of parents to direct the upbringing of 
their children and to control their education: Meyer v. Nebraska,19 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,20 and Prince v. Massachusetts.21 The Court 
has invoked Meyer and Pierce as a starting point in much of its 
modern substantive due process analysis and in its recent parental 
rights cases.22 To best understand the Court’s most recent articulation 
                                                 
11 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937); see also Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. at 721. 
12 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
13 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
14 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
15 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
16 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1952); see also Wudtke v. 
Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a public teacher 
successfully stated a substantive due process claim against a school district 
superintendent, who she claimed sexually assaulted her, based on her liberty interest 
in bodily integrity).  
17 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
18 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944); Pierce 
v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
399 (1923).  
19 Id. 
20 268 U.S. at 534–535. 
21 321 U.S. at 164. 
22 Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From 
Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 72 (2006) 
4
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of substantive due process rights in the parental rights context and the 
Seventh Circuits’ application of this concept, it is necessary to 
examine the genesis and development of this jurisprudence. 
Although the Supreme Court would later credit these early 
twentieth century decisions with unambiguously establishing the 
substantive due process right of family relations,23 a careful 
examination of these cases demonstrates that the Court’s rhetoric 
supporting this liberty interest outstripped the actual application and 
definition of this right. Rather than providing a clear endorsement of 
this liberty interest by basing its holdings solely on family rights, the 
Court’s decisions in the context of educational rights primarily relied 
on the right to acquire knowledge24 and focused on First Amendment 
liberty interests in the context of child labor laws25 to reach these 
respective holdings. This inability to fully articulate the scope and 
definition of familial rights demonstrates the Court’s ambivalence 
towards this substantive due process right from its inception and 
foreshadows the current ambiguity as to its application.     
 
1. The Establishment of the Right of Parents to  
Control Their Children’s Education  
     
a. Meyer v. Nebraska 
 
In 1919, spurred by anti-immigrant nativism and the experience of 
World War I, the Nebraska legislature enacted a statute, the “Siman 
language law,” that restricted the teaching of foreign languages before 
the eighth grade in public and private schools.26 In 1920, Robert 
                                                                                                                   
(arguing that use of Meyer and its progeny by the Court in support of a substantive 
due process liberty right of parents is “sporadic and often is joined with other 
constitutional claims” and that only the recent Troxel v. Granville unambiguously 
articulates a foundation for this substantive due process right).  
23 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
24 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–535. 
25 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944). 
26 Id. at 73–74 (2006); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: 
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1003–
5
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Meyer, a teacher at a Lutheran parochial school, was convicted of 
violating the law by teaching a ten-year-old student German and was 
fined $25.27 The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld his conviction,28 and 
Meyer appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which concluded that the 
Nebraska statute was unconstitutional.29 
The Supreme Court struck down the Nebraska statute because it 
conflicted with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which it held guarantees an individual the liberty “to acquire useful 
knowledge” and “to establish a home and bring up children.”30 In 
reaching its decision, the Court considered these two liberty interests 
in tandem and did not isolate or identify the scope of the right to 
establish a home and raise children. Rather, the Court reasoned that 
because education and the acquisition of knowledge are 
unquestionable values to citizens and it is the “natural duty of the 
parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life,” it 
follows that a teacher’s ability to teach diverse subjects and a parent’s 
ability to engage such a teacher for their children’s benefit are 
protected liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment.31 The Nebraska 
statute infringed on this liberty interest because it blocked parents 
from being able to hire or send their children to a school that teaches a 
language that they considered useful to the upbringing of their 
children.32  
                                                                                                                   
04 (1992); William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical 
Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 130, 135 (1988). 
27 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1923). 
28 Id. Scholars have argued that the Nebraska Siman language law was part of a 
nationwide attack on parochial schools that sought to Americanize foreigners 
through legislation mandating compulsory public school attendance. William G. 
Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental Rights 
Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 177 (2000); David B. Tyack, 
The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74, 
75 (Oct. 1968). 
29 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402–03. 
30 Id. at 399–400. 
31 Id. at 400. 
32 Id. Lawrence argues that Meyer’s focus on the danger of the state limiting 
the acquisition of knowledge and homogenizing its populace weakens claims that 
6
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 146
The Court’s recognition of the individual liberty interest in 
acquiring useful knowledge and bringing up children was a novel 
development.33 During this period, the so-called Lochner Era,34 the 
Court’s recognition of liberty interests primarily focused on cases 
involving individual’s ability to form and be bound by contracts free 
from state intervention without a valid police power rationale.35 
Nevertheless, in expanding its recognition of liberty interests beyond 
the contractual context, Meyer applied the standard Lochner Era test 
for laws infringing on substantive due process rights. The Court 
maintained that: 
 
[T]his liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of 
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is 
arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within 
the competency of the State to effect. Determination by the 
legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is 
not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the 
courts.36 
 
Thus, while the Court “appreciate[d]” that the Nebraska law sought to 
create a homogeneous population with American ideals and 
communicate an aversion to recent “truculent adversaries,” it held that 
the law was not aimed at eliminating an emergency, which “renders 
knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly 
harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of 
rights long freely enjoyed.”37 In striking down this state statute, the 
                                                                                                                   
this case unambiguously established parental rights. She claims that in spite of the 
Court’s “[l]ofty opening definitions of liberty” Meyer is primarily decided on 
educational grounds rather than on “state interference in the intimacies of home and 
family.” Lawrence, note 22, at 77.  
33 Lawrence, supra note 22, at 76 n.31. 
34 David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism,  92 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2003). 
35  Id. at 24. 
36 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400. 
37 Id. at 402–03. 
7
Richard: Familia Interruptus: The Seventh Circuit’s Application of the Sub
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 147
Court maintained that states may not interfere with the “long freely 
enjoyed” liberty interest of parents to control the upbringing of their 
children and to acquire useful knowledge unless the regulation sought 
to eliminate a harm to children or the populace at large.38  
 
b. Pierce v. Society of Sisters 
 
Two years after Meyer, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court 
returned to the issue of parental rights to control their children’s 
education grounded in the due process clause.39 In 1922, in an attempt 
to shut down private schools, Oregon adopted a statute that required 
that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend public 
schools.40  
Although the Court partially grounded its reasoning in a desire to 
limit states’ power to “homogenize its citizenry,”41 it directly applied 
Meyer and held that the Oregon statute “unreasonably interfere[d] with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”42 Like Meyer, Pierce’s 
recognition of parental rights was interwoven with the liberty interest 
to acquire useful knowledge.43 Thus, while the Court again 
rhetorically recognized familial rights, its holding focused primarily 
on the need to protect the educational choices provided by private 
                                                 
38 Id. at 403. 
39 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
40 Ross, note 26, at 178. This statute was part of a national campaign for 
compulsory public education that was at least partially motivated by anti-
Catholicism. Id. 
41 Lawrence, supra note 22, at 78. 
42 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534– 35. “The child is not the mere creature of the State; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Id. at 535.  
43 Both Meyer and Pierce have been interpreted as being decided on property 
rights: “the liberty of the schools to conduct a business, the right of private school 
teachers to follow their occupation, and the freedom of schools and the parents to 
enter into contracts.” Ross, supra note 26, at 178. 
8
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schools that best prepare children for their later social obligations.44 
Familial rights in this instance were extended insofar as they aided 
educational rights. 
Regardless of which liberty interest the court emphasized, their 
presence triggered the Lochner Era test for protected liberty interests, 
which stated that “the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation 
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the State.”45 Concluding that there was nothing 
“inherently harmful”46 in private schools and that they were in fact 
“long regarded as useful and meritorious,”47 the Court held the state 
had no adequate rationale to justify the statute’s adoption.48 The statute 
was therefore struck down under the Court’s supervisory power to 
protect the liberty interest of parents controlling their children’s 
upbringing and education.49  
 
2. The Assertion of the State’s Parens Patriae Power and the Limits of 
Parental Rights 
 
Although the Court in Meyer and Pierce recognized broad 
parental rights in the realm of their children’s education and 
upbringing, subsequent Courts did not shy away from asserting the 
state’s power to protect the welfare of children. These cases 
demonstrate the deference that the Court granted to states, which 
enacted legislation intended to protect children, and the limitations of 
parental rights.  
                                                 
44 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534– 35. 
45 Id. at 535. This test and the Meyer precedent were applied again in 1927 in 
another parental rights case in the context of foreign language instruction. Farrington 
v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). The Court struck down Hawaii’s territorial 
legislation aimed at limiting the instruction of Japanese in private schools. The Court 
held that the statute infringed on the rights of the school’s owners as well as the 
parents who chose to send their children to these schools. Id. at 299. 
46 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 534–35. 
49 Id. 
9
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In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court upheld the enforcement of 
Massachusetts’ child labor laws, which restricted children from 
working on public streets.50 The case involved the conviction of a 
nine-year-old girl and her guardian aunt for “selling” Jehovah 
Witnesses' publications on the public streets.51 Primarily challenging 
their conviction on First Amendment freedom of religion grounds “to 
preach the gospel . . . by public distribution” in conformity of their 
religious beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses, the aunt also buttressed this 
claim by arguing that the statute infringed on her parental right to 
control the upbringing of her niece in accordance with their religious 
beliefs, as secured by the due process clause under Meyer.52  
Citing Meyer and Pierce as precedent, the Prince Court accepted 
the aunt’s claim to a parental right, stating that “the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function 
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder.”53 Further supporting the installment of parental 
rights as fundamental liberty interests, the Court considered parental 
rights to be “basic in a democracy.”54  
Despite this clear rhetorical endorsement, the rationale of Prince’s 
holding was less precise. Like Meyer and Pierce, which recognized 
parental rights in tandem with the right to acquire useful knowledge, 
Prince’s discussion of parental rights was interwoven with the child’s 
                                                 
50 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The law prohibited girls under eighteen to “sell, expose 
or offer for sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of 
merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of bootblack or scavenger, or 
any other trade, in any street or public place.” Id. at 160–61 (quoting § 69 of Mass. 
Gen. Laws, Ter. Ed., c. 149, as amended by Acts and Resolves of 1939, c. 461). The 
law’s enforcement provisions provided punishment of imprisonment or fines to 
“[a]ny parent, guardian or custodian having a minor under his control who compels 
or permits such minor to work in violation” of § 69. Prince, 321 U.S. at 161 (quoting 
§ 81, Mass. Gen. Laws, Ter. Ed.).  
51 Prince, 321 U.S. at 162. 
52 Id. at 164. The Court articulated the aunt’s liberty interest as her right as a 
guardian to “bring up the child in the way he should go, which for the appellant 
means to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith.” Id. 
53 Id. at 166. 
54 Id. at 165. 
10
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liberty interest in exercising her religion.55 Thus, despite Prince’s 
recognition of parental rights, this substantive due process right was 
again inextricably bound to another liberty interest.  
Irrespective of this intertwined recognition of parental rights, 
Prince held that the guardian’s right to rear her child was outweighed 
by the state’s broad parens patriae56 power to protect the child’s 
welfare.57 A parent's authority over their child thus may be trumped by 
state regulations aimed to foster the child’s interest. The fact that the 
parental right in this case involved matters of religion only strengthens 
the broad power of the state to trump this parental liberty interest.58 
Noting that the statute was adopted to protect young children from the 
“crippling effects of child employment,”59 Prince concluded that 
“[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves . . . [b]ut it does 
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of 
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”60 The state 
thus possessed a “wide range of power for limiting parental freedom 
and authority in things affecting the child's welfare,”61 because the 
continuance of a “democratic society rests . . . upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.”62 And, 
while the Court continued to recognize the important parental right to 
control and manage their children’s upbringing, it was unwilling to 
                                                 
55 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. “The parent’s conflict with the state over control of 
the child and his training is serious enough when only secular matters are concerned. 
It becomes the more so when an element of religious conviction enters.” Id. 
56 “[Latin for ‘parent of his country’] 1. The state regarded as a sovereign; the 
state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
57 Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 
58 Id. at 166. 
59 Id. at 168. 
60 Id. at 170. 
61 Id. at 167. 
62 Id. at 168. 
11
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strike down a statute that “regulated within reasonable limits” the 
“legitimate objective[]” of protecting the well-being of children.63  
Because the Court’s early cases involving parental rights did not 
specifically isolate this liberty interest,64 it is difficult to determine 
whether its holdings would have been maintained based on familial 
rights alone.65 What can be said, however, is that the Court’s rhetoric 
regarding familial rights outweighs the application of this right in 
these holdings. While the Court asserted the importance of protecting 
the parental right to control their child’s upbringing, its holding 
primarily relied on the importance of education in Meyer66 and 
Pierce67 and on religious expression in Prince.68 The scope of familial 
rights was thus left undefined outside of the context of these other 
liberty interests.  
Nevertheless, these early decisions did broadly define the parental 
realm as a constitutionally protected liberty interest based on 
substantive due process. From these cases, this protection extended to 
parents’ control of their children’s education and upbringing69 and 
could only be trumped by the state if the regulation was reasonably 
limited and aimed at protecting the welfare of children.70   
                                                 
63 Id. at 169–70. 
64 Later cases involving parental rights continued to analyze this liberty interest 
in tandem with other claims. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) 
(striking down Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law and basing its 
holding more on the protection of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176–79 (1976) (in upholding a federal statute 
that prohibited private schools from excluding students based on their race, the Court 
declined to extend the parental right to control their children’s education beyond the 
ability to challenge limitations to subject matter).  
65 Ross argues that the Meyer and Pierce decisions relied on substantive due 
process rights because freedom of religion and speech bases were not available to the 
Court because the Bill of Rights had not yet been incorporated into state law. Ross, 
supra note 26, at 178–79.  
66 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
67 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
68 321 U.S. at 165. 
69 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.  
70 Prince, 321 U.S. at 170. 
12
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B. Modern Familial Rights and the Introduction of New Ambiguity: 
Troxel v. Granville 
 
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court issued its most recent 
articulation of the substantive due process right of familial relations.71 
What makes Troxel important beyond its recentness is that it was the 
first Supreme Court case to recognize familial rights independent of 
any other constitutional claim.72 Thus, the Court had an opportunity to 
define the scope of this liberty interest and to provide a clear test for 
its application. While the Court definitively recognized the right to 
familial relations and removed any residue of uncertainty from its 
previous cases as to its status amongst the other established 
substantive due process rights, the plurality opinion in Troxel 
significantly diluted familial rights by limiting their protection to a 
rebuttable presumption that parents act in the best interest of their 
children.73 In addition to lowering the protections afforded to familial 
rights, the Court also failed to provide lower courts with an applicable 
standard or review for this liberty interest.74 Thus, in clarifying its past 
decisions regarding familial rights, the Court effectively introduced a 
new ambivalence towards this liberty interest. 
 
1. The Plurality Decision 
 
Writing for the plurality, Justice O’Connor, in one sentence, 
erased any doubt that parental rights were not a fundamental liberty 
interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. After reiterating the Court’s recognition of substantive 
due process rights and the numerous parental rights precedents,75 
                                                 
71 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).  
72 Lawrence, supra note 22, at 100. 
73 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67. 
74 Id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring). 
75 See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long 
line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the 
13
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Justice O’Connor stated that, “[i]n light of this extensive precedent, it 
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”76 
Discounting any ambiguity in the Court’s previous treatment of 
familial rights, the plurality further affirmed that “the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps 
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court.”77  
Troxel involved a Washington statute that permitted any person to 
petition the court for visitation rights whenever the visits served the 
best interest of the child.78 Following this statute, a Washington trial 
court granted visitation rights to the paternal grandparents of children 
against the wishes of their mother, reasoning that these visits would be 
                                                                                                                   
Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes 
the righ[t] . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one's children”) (citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982) (discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) 
(“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the 
family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have 
consistently followed that course”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) 
(“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent 
and child is constitutionally protected”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 
(1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of 
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role 
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as 
an enduring American tradition”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It 
is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and 
management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for 
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements’”) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
76 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
77 Id. at 65 (Citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. 
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
78 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. 
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in the interest of the children.79 On appeal, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that this statute unconstitutionally interfered with the 
“fundamental right of parents to rear their children” because the statute 
required “no threshold showing of harm,” which it concluded 
contradicts the constitutional standard that allows state interference 
only to prevent harm to the child.80  
While Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion affirmed the 
Washington Supreme Court’s judgment, it articulated a more limited 
definition of parental rights based on a burden-shifting mechanism to 
determine the child’s best interest.81 Whereas the Washington Supreme 
Court’s reasoning required a showing of harm to contravene parents’ 
liberty interest in controlling the upbringing of their children, the 
Troxel plurality maintained that parental rights required regulations 
only to show adequate deference to parents’ inherent ability to “act in 
the best interests of their children.”82 The plurality thus limited the 
scope of parental rights to a rebuttable presumption that fit parents 
“make the best decisions concerning the rearing of”83 their children; in 
the parental visitation context this meant that the burden of proof was 
on third-parties seeking visitation to show that the child’s parent(s) 
were unfit and were not acting in the child’s best interest.84 
Accordingly, the Court declared the Washington statute 
unconstitutional because it was “breathtakingly broad”85 and failed to 
recognize proper deference to parents. The statute allowed any person 
at any time to petition the court for visitation when it would serve the 
best interest of the child, and it gave no deference to the parent’s 
decision that visitation would not be in the child’s best interest.86 By 
placing the best-interest determination in the hands of a judge and 
                                                 
79 Id. at 61. 
80 Id. at 60–63. 
81 Id. at 67. 
82 Id. at 68 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)). 
83 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. 
84 Id. at 68–69. 
85 Id. at 67.  
86 Id.  
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giving no special weight to the parent’s choice, Troxel concluded that 
this statute effectively took away the parents’ control of the upbringing 
of their children and exceeded the bounds of the due process clause.87  
 
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
 
As demonstrated by Troxel’s concurring and dissenting opinions, 
this case, while firmly establishing familial rights as a protected liberty 
interest, introduced new ambiguities into the application and scope of 
this right.    
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter criticized the plurality 
opinion because it failed to “set out exact metes and bounds to the 
protected interest of a parent in their relationship with his child.”88 By 
not articulating a standard of review for legislation that infringes on 
parental rights,89 Justice Thomas further noted that the plurality left 
lower courts with the task of determining the scope of this liberty 
interest.90  
Justice Souter, however, concentrated his criticism on the 
plurality’s dilution of familial rights to a liberty interest protected only 
by a rebuttable presumption.91 He agreed with the Washington 
Supreme Court that the statute was unconstitutional on its face, and he 
disagreed with the plurality’s recognition of only a presumption of 
parental deference. 92 Stating that parental choice regarding their 
children is not “merely a default rule in the absence” of a more 
enlightened determination by a judge, Justice Souter criticized the 
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring). 
89 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
90 Lenese Herbert, Plantation Lullabies: How Fourth Amendment Policing 
Violates the Fourteenth Amendment Right of African Americans to Parent, 19 ST. 
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 197, 207–08 (2005). In pointing out this curious 
omission, Justice Thomas took the opportunity to state his preference that the 
appropriate standard of review for infringement on familial rights is strict scrutiny. 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
91 Id. at 68 (Souter, J., concurring). 
92 Id. at 75. 
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plurality’s limitation of parental rights to only a presumption that their 
decisions were in the child’s interest.93 Citing the “repeatedly 
recognized right of upbringing”94 from Meyer onward, he warned that 
the plurality’s rule threatened to make this right a sham if a judge’s 
decision was able to trump that of parents.  
In his dissent, Justice Stevens articulated a clearer approach to 
familial relations rights.95 Agreeing with the plurality’s limited 
definition of parental rights, he disputed Justice Souter’s assertion that 
there is any precedent for the requirement that a threshold showing of 
harm be met before the state may challenge a parent’s decision 
regarding their children.96 In his view, such a standard would 
“establish a rigid constitutional shield” for any parental choice or 
action.97  
Justice Stevens came closest to articulating a standard for the 
analysis of familial relations cases by stating that there is a rebuttable 
“presumption that parental decisions generally serve the best interests 
of their children” and that “in the normal case [this] interest is 
paramount.”98 In his view, parental rights are not absolute, and the 
Court’s precedent supports a balancing test of the parent’s interests in 
a child “against the state’s long-recognized interests as parens 
patriae.”99 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Adoption of a Balancing Test 
 
Despite its clear endorsement of familial rights as a fundamental 
right derived from the due process clause, the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
93 Id. at 79. 
94 Id. at 78. 
95 Id. at 80–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
96 Id. at 86. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 88 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303–04 (1993); Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979); Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).  
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reluctance to articulate a test in which to analyze this right100 has 
meant that circuit courts have had to develop this standard on their 
own. Two Seventh Circuit decisions decided after Troxel illustrate this 
Circuit’s application of familial rights and its adoption of and 
development upon Justice Stevens’ balancing test.  
In Brokaw v. Mercer County, two children, six and three years old, 
were removed from their home and became wards of the state for four 
months after relatives of the parents filed claims of child neglect.101 In 
analyzing whether this separation violated the parents’ due process 
right to familial relations, the court emphasized that the right of 
parents to “bear and raise their children is the most fundamental of all 
rights—the foundation of not just this country, but of all 
civilization.”102 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that this 
constitutional right is not absolute and is “limited by the compelling 
governmental interest in the protection of children particularly where 
[they] need to be protected from their own parents.”103  
To determine whether familial rights should be protected, the 
Seventh Circuit adopted its own test used in the Fourth Amendment 
context104 and balanced the fundamental right to familial relations 
against the government’s interest in protecting children from harm or 
abuse.105 In analyzing the government’s interest, the court held that “a 
                                                 
100 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
101 Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1007–08 (7th Cir. 2000). 
102 Id. at 1018–19 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The 
history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental 
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children . . . This primary role of the 
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an 
enduring American tradition.”); Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2003). 
103 Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019 (Citing Croft v. Westmoreland County Children 
and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Weller v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Serv., 901 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1990) (substantive due process does not 
categorically bar the government from altering parental custody rights).  
104 Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Wallis 
ex rel Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (the same legal 
standard applies in evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the 
removal of children). 
105 Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019; Heck, 327 F.3d at 520. 
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state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it 
has some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of 
abuse.”106  
Applying this test, Brokaw held that at the summary judgment 
stage there was insufficient evidence that the government possessed 
reasonable suspicion of abuse, and accordingly, the state’s interference 
in the parents’ right to bear and raise their children was not justified.107 
Although the lack of evidence for reasonable suspicion was a key to 
the court’s determination, the considerable period of time—four 
months—that the parents’ rights were violated was also 
determinative.108  
In a 2003 decision, Doe v. Heck, the Seventh Circuit expanded 
and refined this balancing test for analyzing familial relations cases.109 
The case involved the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family 
Services’ (the “Department”) investigation of alleged corporeal 
punishment at a private school.110 After the Department conducted 
prolonged interviews at the school with students thought to be 
involved in the alleged abuse, eight sets of parents brought suit against 
the Department and the workers who conducted the investigation for 
violating their constitutional right to familial relations under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.111  
The Doe court noted that Troxel failed to provide lower courts 
with the level of scrutiny to be applied in cases alleging violations of 
this constitutional right; however, it concluded that “courts are to use 
some form of heightened scrutiny.”112 Echoing Brokaw, the court 
                                                 
106 Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019; see also Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 
368, 373 (1999) (fundamental interest in the familial relationship must be balanced 
against the state’s interest in protecting children suspected of being abused).  
107 Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019. 
108 Id. 
109 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003). 
110 Id. at 500. 
111 Id. at 517.  This was one of numerous issues decided by the court.  
112 Id. at 519. 
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maintained that the right to familial relations is not absolute and is 
limited by the government’s compelling interest in protecting 
children.113  
In Doe, the Seventh Circuit also refined its balancing test by 
adopting reasonableness factors that it had previously used to evaluate 
Fourth Amendment claims.114 When considering the competing 
interests involved in familial relations claims, Doe held that courts 
must consider: the nature of the privacy interest upon which the action 
taken by the State intrudes; the character of the intrusion that is 
complained of; the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern 
at issue; and the efficacy of the means employed by the government 
for meeting this concern.115 These factors provide courts with an 
analytic framework in which to evaluate whether the governmental 
interference with an individual right is justified and whether this 
interference is “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances” to 
that original justification.116 Nevertheless, Doe emphasized that the 
last two factors constituted a threshold that must be met before 
inquiring further.117 If the challenged governmental actions were not 
based on “some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a child ha[d] been abused of [was] in 
imminent danger of abuse,” the government can have no interest in 
protecting children from their parents.118  
In applying this test, Doe concluded that the custodial interviews 
without parental consent were a considerable intrusion upon the 
parents’ privacy, as the parents exhibited a subjective expectation of 
                                                 
113 Id. at 520. 
114 327 F.3d at 520. 
115 Id. at 520 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 654, 654–60 
(1995); Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1058–59 (7th Cir. 
2000)). 
116 Doe, 327 F.3d at 520. 
117 Id. at 520–21. 
118 Id. at 521 (citing Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 
2000); Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123, 
1126 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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privacy by enrolling their child in a private school.119 Moreover, the 
court considered the subject of the interview, potential abuse by the 
parents, to exacerbate the character of the intrusion.120 Nevertheless, 
Doe ultimately held that the Department violated the parents’ familial 
rights because there was no evidence that gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that the parents had abused their children.121 Emphasizing 
the constitutional presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of 
their children, Doe concluded that the Department failed to presume 
the fitness of the parents and treated corporeal punishment as per se 
abuse, which the Department’s own standards considered insufficient 
without further evidence of physical injuries.122 
Doe demonstrates the Seventh Circuit’s struggle to adopt a test 
that both protects parents’ liberty interest in controlling their children 
but also recognizes the limits of this right. Acknowledging that the 
Supreme Court has provided little guidance to carry out this task,123 
Doe’s balancing test embodies the ambiguous status of this liberty 
interest and provides courts in its circuit ample freedom to protect this 
right based on the facts before them. The application of this balancing 
test and the exercise of this discretion is demonstrated in U.S. v. 
Hollingsworth.124 This decision provides a predictive case study as to 
how future courts can and will treat familial rights claims. 
 
 
 II. U.S. V. HOLLINGSWORTH 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
For the first five months of the 2005 school year, Tamica 
Hollingsworth’s nine-year old daughter, T.H., exhibited troubling 
                                                 
119 Doe, 327 F.3d at 512. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 524. 
122 Id. at 521–22. 
123 Id. at 519. 
124 495 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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conduct at school that concerned school officials.125 During this 
period, T.H. was late for school twenty times and was sent to the 
principal’s office for disciplinary reasons on six occasions.126 The 
school’s truancy police officer, Steve Denny, and the school’s 
principal, Darlene Westerfield, unsuccessfully attempted to contact 
Ms. Hollingsworth by phone and through notes sent home to discuss 
her daughter’s behavior and tardiness.127 The principal was eventually 
able to contact Ms. Hollingsworth and set up a meeting with her at the 
school.128 When Ms. Hollingsworth failed to appear at a December 7, 
2005 meeting, the principal questioned T.H. about the difficultly 
contacting her mother, and T.H. said that her mother would not answer 
phone calls that their caller ID identified as coming from the school.129 
When told that Officer Denny would then need to go to her home to 
contact her mother directly, T.H. responded that he could not come to 
the home until her mother and her boyfriend, James McCotry, were 
able to remove their “stuff” and other items that they did not want 
outsiders to see.130 Breaking into tears, T.H. also informed the 
principal that her mother occasionally left her home alone and that this 
frightened her.131 
Notified of T.H.’s remarks, Officer Denny began a criminal 
investigation of Ms. Hollingsworth and arranged for the school social 
worker, Julie Hoyt, to meet with T.H. for the sole purpose of furthering 
his investigation.132 Officer Denny was eventually able to contact Ms. 
Hollingsworth and discuss her daughter’s behavior, but he did not seek 
permission for or inform Ms. Hollingsworth of Ms. Hoyt’s scheduled 
meeting with T.H..133 In the subsequent twenty-minute meeting at the 
                                                 
125 Id. at 798. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 




132 Id. at 799 n.1. 
133 Id. at 798. 
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school conducted by Ms. Hoyt, T.H. identified the previously 
mentioned “stuff” as marijuana, which T.H. confirmed was smoked 
and found around her home on a daily basis.134 She also told Ms. Hoyt 
that her mother and Mr. McCotry occasionally brought her along on 
drug runs.135 Ms. Hoyt and Officer Denny subsequently transmitted 
this information to the prosecutor’s office, which used it to obtain a 
search warrant for Ms. Hollingsworth’s home.136 The search of the 
home yielded a firearm and significant amounts of cash and crack 
cocaine in the master bedroom as well as on Mr. McCotry’s person.137  
After her indictment on numerous drug charges, Ms. 
Hollingsworth sought to suppress the evidence garnered from the 
search.138 The district court granted Ms. Hollingsworth’s motion 
because it found that the police violated her substantive due process 
rights by questioning her daughter during school hours without her 
knowledge for the sole purpose of incriminating the mother, which 
amounted to an abuse of governmental power that “shocks the 
conscience.”139  
                                                 





139 Id. McCotry was charged with similar drug charges and also sought to 
suppress the evidence yield in the search. Id. Conceding that the police did not have 
probable cause to obtain the warrant, the district court, however, denied McCotry’s 
motion to suppress under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. 
McCotry was convicted at trial of simple possession of crack cocaine and intent to 
distribute marijuana, and at sentencing the district court imposed 188-month 
sentence for the cocaine possession and a concurrent 120-month sentence for the 
marijuana conviction. Id. at 800. The court imposed these harsh sentences even 
though the jury did not determine the drug quantity, which is required by Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Id. The district court considered this 
Apprendi error harmless because the parties did not dispute the amount of drugs 
involved. Id. Along with the district court’s ruling on his motion to suppress and the 
admission of his suppression testimony at trial, McCotry appealed his sentence. Id. 
The Seventh Circuit panel considered his appeal along with Ms. Hollingsworth’s 
appeal and confirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. at 799–800, 803–806. 
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The government appealed the district court’s ruling that granted 
Ms. Hollingsworth’s motion to suppress, and the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed the issue de novo.140 In reversing the district court’s ruling, 
the Seventh Circuit applied the Brokaw/Doe test141 that balances an 
individual’s right to familial relations against the government’s 
competing interests and held that Ms. Hollingsworth’s interest in 
“maintaining a relationship with her child free from state 
interference,” while significant, was outweighed by the government’s 
compelling interest in solving a drug crime as well as maintaining the 
safety of T.H..142 The court concluded that the government’s conduct 
in interviewing Ms. Hollingsworth’s daughter for a brief period of 
time without any coercive interrogation techniques was minimal and 
that this “de minimis intrusion” neither shocked the conscience143 nor 
lacked “reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate 
governmental objective.”144  
 
B. Hollingsworth’s Application of the Balancing Test 
 
In applying the Brokaw/Doe balancing test, Hollingsworth 
expanded its interpretation of governmental interests to include not 
only the protection of children from harm or abuse, but also the 
“solving drug crimes” involving the child’s parent.145 In addressing the 
nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, the court 
maintained that the government had a compelling interest to speak 
with T.H. because Officer Denny had “some reason to believe that 
Hollingsworth was engaged in illegal activity.”146 Combined with 
T.H.’s behavioral issues at school and comments about being left home 
                                                 
140 Id. at 800. 
141 See supra Section I.B.2.c. 
142 Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d at 802. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 803 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 
(1998). 
145 Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d at 802–03. 
146 Id. at 802. 
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alone, the court held that Ms. Hollingsworth’s reluctance to speak with 
school officials provided Officer Denny with reasonable suspicion that 
Hollingsworth was exposing her child to drugs.147 Despite the concern 
in T.H.’s safety in being left alone and exposed to illegal drugs, the 
court conceded that ultimately the government’s interest was in 
solving the underlying crime of narcotics distribution.148 Thus, in 
contrast to Brokaw,149 and Doe,150 which permitted governmental 
interference in familial relations in the context of potential child 
abuse,151 Hollingsworth expands the governmental justification to 
violate this constitutional right in circumstances where a child is 
present in a potentially criminal environment.152  
The court’s expansion of governmental interest, however, must be 
seen in the context of the balancing test that it applies to Officer 
Denny’s intrusive activities. The officer ordered the social worker to 
conduct the short and non-coercive interview while T.H. was in public 
school.153 While this school interview of T.H. without her mother’s 
permission raises privacy issues similar to those expressed Doe, the 
court distinguishes this interview with Doe because the private school 
principal in Doe objected to the interview with the Department154 
                                                 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 802–03. 
149 Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000). 
150 Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2003). 
151 See also Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 601 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that removing a child from school for several hours without permission of 
parents to examine her for possible sexual abuse did not violate the parents’ 
substantive due process rights because there was substantial evidence of abuse).  
152 See United States. v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 885–87 (9th Cir. 1980) (In an 
investigation of drug distribution, and officer offered child money at the family 
home to tell him where his mother’s heroin was hidden. This evidence was held to 
be admissible, and the court rejected the defendant’s substantive due process 
argument because police may pay informants for information and young children 
may aid investigation. In contrast, Penn’s dissent argued that family relationship 
were highly valued and the law should not make parents and children apprehensive 
about exchanging information or encourage children to turn against their parents). 
153 Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d at 798. 
154 Id. at 802. 
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whereas T.H.’s principal was complicit in the interview of T.H..155 
Parents delegate some parental responsibilities to school officials 
when they send their children to school; however, parents also should 
reasonably expect these same officials to speak to their children and 
report problems to law enforcement if there are serious concerns with 
the child’s home life.156 Thus, the inquiries made by Officer Denny 
and conducted by the social worker did not infringe upon any 
reasonable privacy interest of Ms. Hollingsworth.157  
The court also questioned whether the twenty-minute interview 
conducted by the social worker constituted a substantial intrusion into 
the familial relationship.158 Reasoning that the interview was brief and 
lacked any coercive interrogation techniques, the court concluded that 
the government’s intrusion into Ms. Hollingsworth’s familial 
relationship with her daughter was minimal—so much so that it 
commented that it was doubtful that such a minimal intrusion could 




Applying the Brokaw/Doe balancing to the facts before it, 
Hollingsworth held that the government’s interest in solving the 
underlying drug crime and in T.H.’s safety outweighed Ms. 
Hollingsworth’s interest in preventing governmental intrusion into her 
familial relations with her daughter.160 This holding effectively 
expanded the court’s understanding of governmental interest from 
protecting children from actual or potential harm to solving drug 
crimes. Given that the courts’ original justification for permitting the 
intrusion into familial relations stemmed from the state’s interest in 
preventing child neglect and actual or imminent abuse, this expansive 
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definition into the realm of law enforcement outside of the direct 
effect on the child creates a potential for governmental overreach and 
abuse. The idea of public schools being used as quasi-interrogation 
rooms to further criminal investigations is chilling.  
The balancing test endorsed by the Seventh Circuit, however, 
mitigates such fears because it protects individuals’ right to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the familial sphere by 
balancing this governmental interest with their expectation of privacy 
from unreasonable intrusions. Thus, while in Hollingsworth the nature 
of the privacy interest and the character of the intrusion was 
minimal,161 more intrusive governmental investigations will be 
prevented by the proper application of this balancing test. The adopted 
test is a practical tool that provides courts the ability to protect 
children from potential harm within the familial sphere while 
simultaneously protecting the familial sphere from unconstitutional 
intrusion into the preferences and proclivities of families. 
The Seventh Circuit’s test is also consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s historical reluctance to fully protect and recognize familial 
rights. From its initial recognition of this liberty interest, the Court has 
voiced its support of familial rights rhetorically, but its early holdings 
involving this right consistently focused on other constitutional 
claims.162 Even when familial rights were unambiguously endorsed in 
Troxel v. Granville, the Court was deeply divided over the scope of 
this liberty interest and the standard of review with which it would be 
afforded protection.163   
The Supreme Court’s struggle to clarify its position cannot be 
considered merely accidental. Rather, the ambivalence that surrounds 
the jurisprudence regarding familial rights is indicative of the Court’s 
reluctance to permit the familial sphere to become sufficiently fortified 
such that it would prevent regular state intervention. While it considers 
                                                 
161 Id. at 802.  
162 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–535 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944). 
163 530 U.S. 57, 66–68 (2000). 
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familial rights to be a fundamental right,164 this right is significantly 
limited because the corollary of it exercise is the potential risk to the 
health, safety, and broadly defined well-being of children. Thus, at the 
same time that the Court has recognized familial rights to be a 
fundamental liberty interest it has obfuscated the application of its 
protection for fear of proscribing state intervention into the lives of 
children. The Court’s ambivalence towards this due process right is 
thus intentional. 
Hollingsworth provides an ideal example of the Supreme Court’s 
ambiguous familial rights jurisprudence put into practice. The Seventh 
Circuit balancing test provides courts with the flexibility to protect 
familial rights in instances where the potential harm to the child is 
minimal and where the state oversteps its power to intrude into this 
sphere. In instances where this state intrusion is minimal, however, the 
threshold of harm to the child can be significantly lower. In 
Hollingsworth, the court was able to acknowledge that Mrs. 
Hollingsworth had a right to control the upbringing of her child, but it 
was also able to justify the state infringing on this right when there 
was a reasonable suspicion that the child was subject to the potential 
harm of being in the presence of illegal activity.165 Because the 
interrogation was short and the mother had a diminished expectation 
of non-intervention in her relationship with her daughter while she 
attended school, the court did not consider this expansive idea of harm 
excessive.166 In fact, this expansive conception of potential harm 
corresponds to the Supreme Court’s ambivalence towards familial 
rights and serves as a predictive measure of future familial rights 
claims where the general well-being of a child is a stake.          
                                                 
164 Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. 
165 Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d at 802. 
166 Id. 
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